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ABSTRACT  
The Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash is commonly used as for integrity verification in the forensic 
imaging process. The ability to force MD5 hash collisions has been a reality for more than a 
decade, although there is a general consensus that hash collisions are of minimal impact to the 
practice of computer forensics. This paper describes an experiment to determine the results of 
imaging two disks that are identical except for one file, the two versions of which have different 
content but otherwise occupy the same byte positions on the disk, are the same size, and have the 
same hash value.  
Keywords: MD5 hash collisions, forensic imaging, computer forensics, digital forensics 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of hash functions is widely used in 
the practice of digital forensics to ensure the 
integrity of files and the accuracy of forensic 
imaging. The Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash 
algorithm remains as one of the most 
commonly used hashes in digital forensics 
(Casey, 2011; Maras, 2015; Nelson, Phillips, 
& Steuart, 2015). 
Hash collisions -- i.e., the occurrence 
where two files with different content have 
the same hash value -- have been identified 
in several well-known hash algorithms, in 
particular MD5 (McHugh, 2014; Wang, 
Feng, Lai, & Yu, 2004; Wang & Yu, 2005). 
Hashes are used for a variety of applications, 
including digital signature verification, 
computer forensic image verification, user 
identification and authentication, identifying 
known good or bad files in a hashset, and 
secure message exchange. The significance 
and meaning of a third-party being able to 
force hash collisions is different for these 
different applications; while forcing a hash 
collision in an authentication application 
could be quite serious, the impact might be 
less damaging when identifying files in a 
hashset (AccessData, 2006; Lewis, 2008; 
Thompson, 2005). Nevertheless, the use of 
hashing is so ingrained in digital forensics 
training and practice that the impact of such 
collisions in validating an evidentiary copy 
continues to be discussed at conferences and 
training sessions. 
This paper will address the impact of 
MD5 hash collisions on validating the results 
of the computer forensics imaging process. 
Section 2 will identify the specific problem of 
hash collisions as it applies to imaging, 
followed by a restatement of the problem as 
a research question in Section 3. Section 4 
will describe an experimental framework with 
which to test the research hypothesis, 
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followed by test results in Section 5. Section 6 will offer some conclusions. 
2. PROBLEM 
STATEMENT 
The MD5 algorithm is described by Rivest 
(1992) and its use to validate forensic images 
is described in almost all computer forensics 
textbooks, including Casey (2011), Maras 
(2015), and Nelson et al. (2015). AccessData 
(2006) and Thompson (2005), among others, 
have suggested that MD5 hash collisions 
have minimal impact on the results of 
computer forensics examinations and, in 
practice, can be ignored. However, training 
in the computer forensics field for more than 
a quarter century has emphasized the 
importance of hashes as the key to proving 
the integrity of a digital forensic copy -- i.e., 
an image -- almost to the exclusion of the 
efficacy of training, experience, and the 
forensic imaging tools (Cohen, 2013). 
One nightmare scenario for law 
enforcement, as a possible result of MD5 (or 
other) hash collisions, is this: A prosecutor 
introduces a set of N images of child sexual 
assault as evidence at trial, complete with 
the MD5 file hashes. The defense counters by 
producing a set of N images of the defendant 
on a dive boat in Aruba, complete with the 
same set of MD5 hashes. If this situation was 
possible, it can always be resolved, 
presumably, by viewing the original images 
on the evidentiary drive. However, the FUD 
(fear, uncertainty, and doubt) Factor has 
already been seeded and a good argument 
might then be made that could cause a jury -
- or jurist -- to doubt the veracity and 
integrity of even the original evidence 
because the next obvious question is: If the 
first set of (innocent) images has the same 
hash values as the second set of (damning) 
images, could not the second set of images 
have been placed on the evidentiary disk by 
an over-zealous prosecutor or investigator? 
It is well known that MD5 hash collisions 
exist, although they have largely been forced 
to occur in the laboratory (Burr, 2006; 
Gutman, Naccache, & Palmer, 2005; 
McHugh, 2014; Wang, Feng, Lai, & Yu, 
2004; Wang & Yu, 2005). No one has yet 
reported hash collisions occurring in 
"nature;" that is, there are no reports of 
finding two different files on a given disk 
drive having the same MD5 hash. This is not 
surprising, given that there are 2128 (or 
~1043) possible MD5 hash values. 
In digital forensics, we computer hash 
values not only on the individual files but 
also the entire disk that is being imaged. If 
we have two files, A and B, that have the 
same hash but are of different sizes, it is 
clear that the image hash will be different 
because there will be changes not only in the 
file content but also in other parts of the 
disk, such as allocated or unallocated space. 
Indeed, the file system metadata -- e.g., the 
file size in the directory entry as well as File 
Allocation Table (FAT), $Bitmap, or inode 
entries -- will also be different if the file sizes 
differ. 
The impact is less obvious if files A and 
B are the same size because all of the file 
system metadata might be unchanged. Thus, 
is the nightmare scenario suggested above 
actually possible? This could theoretically 
only occur if one believes that the disk image 
hash remains the same if all of the files on 
the disk have the same hash. The experiment 
described in this paper addresses this 
question. 
3. RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
The scenario mentioned in Section 2 can be 
described as follows: Suppose one has two 
files, A and B, that have different content 
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but are the same size and have the same 
MD5 hash value. What is the effect on the 
hash value of two disk images that differ 
only in that one disk contains File A and the 
other disk contains File B (where Files A and 
B occupy the same location on the two disk 
images)? 
The research question is to test the 
following null hypothesis (H0) as follows:  
• The resultant two disk images will 
have the same hash value. 
The alternative hypothesis (H1) is as 
follows:  
• The resultant two disk images will 
have different hash values. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL 
SETUP 
To address the research questions, two files 
were needed that were the same size, had the 
same MD5 hash, and had different content. 
Selinger (2011) provides such a pair of 128-
byte files, called hash1.bin and hash2.bin, 
below: 
hash1.bin 
00000000: d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c 
00000010: 2fcab58712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89 
00000020: 55ad340609f4b30283e488832571415a 
00000030: 085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbdf280373c5b 
00000040: d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6 
00000050: dd53e2b487da03fd02396306d248cda0 
00000060: e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080a80d1e 
00000070: c69821bcb6a8839396f9652b6ff72a70 
 
hash2.bin 
00000000: d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c 
00000010: 2fcab50712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89 
00000020: 55ad340609f4b30283e4888325f1415a 
00000030: 085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbd7280373c5b 
00000040: d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6 
00000050: dd53e23487da03fd02396306d248cda0 
00000060: e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080280d1e 
00000070: c69821bcb6a8839396f965ab6ff72a70 
 
The contents of the two files differ only 
by six bits, shown above in the six bolded 
nibbles. This is confirmed when executing 
the fc (file compare) command against the 
two files: 
Comparing files hash1.bin and hash2.bin 
00000013: 87 07 10000111 00000111 
0000002D: 71 F1 01110001 11110001 
0000003B: F2 72 11110010 01110010 
00000053: B4 34 10110100 00110100 
0000006D: A8 28 10101000 00101000 
0000007B: 2B AB 00101011 10101011 
 
While the two files have the same 128-bit 
MD5 hash, it is worth noting that their 160-
bit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) values 
differ (Eastlake & Jones, 2001). This 
confirms that the contents of the two files 
are actually different and that there is a 
bona fide MD5 hash collision: 
File: hash1.bin 
MD5  9054025255FB1A26E4BC422AEF54EB4 
SHA..A34473CF767C6108A5751A20971F1FDFBA97690A 
 
File: hash2.bin 
MD5  79054025255FB1A26E4BC422AEF54EB4 
SHA  4283DD2D70AF1AD3C2D5FDC917330BF502035658 
 
A 32 MB thumb drive was used as the 
test media. Using Windows 7, the thumb 
drive was formatted using the format e: 
/v:HASHTEST /p:1 command. This 
initialized a FAT16 partition where the data 
area was overwritten with zeroes. The 
contents of the thumb drive were verified 
using the WinHex (v18.6) hex editor. 
Finally, a set of seven files were copied -- six 
arbitrary files plus hash1.bin -- to the thumb 
drive. The file list and hash values were: 
File: 100_0230.JPG 
MD5  097D23B541E4F58F03C57D410C3E3AD5 
SHA  EB916AF75CB5B5BB145F7C11DF17FEC2B04B4395 
 
File: Charts_Navigation.pdf 
MD5  4942439FA574809EEAFFF72989FE4276 
SHA  6DF61583B57FE4832AD5929E14AFA10638836FA9 
 
File: diveboat.jpg 
MD5  91700649FD62204C3675A045142424E8 
SHA  B043E115E14C9EA3870D208526EEF300D4F4CCEC 
 
File: hash1.bin 
MD5  79054025255FB1A26E4BC422AEF54EB4 
SHA  A34473CF767C6108A5751A20971F1FDFBA97690A 
 
File: IMG_1425.JPG 
MD5  CB8FE970560AA6184ED1BC2EEC887681 
SHA  8A37616C53CD53B1281B32889A07E29EAC99B09B 
 
File: in_5615551872.flv 
MD5  27DE3209E3B68414A7429E4104C22185 
SHA  40E6AD48C728C4FF916E354B962FBA4B5C7C77A6 
 
File: PICT0131_GCK.JPG 
MD5  A9ABC3E926F93A03D4844323B21C513D 
SHA  C7FD4F3B8F743BF6202E6C57CC621A0EE6F5C6B5 
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5. TESTS AND RESULTS 
Four tests were conducted on the media 
described above. The results described in this 
section are summarized in Table 1. 
In Test #1, the thumb drive was imaged 
using FTK Imager (v3.1.3.2). The purpose of 
this test was merely to prepare a baseline 
disk image and set of hash values. The image 
verification MD5 hash of the thumb drive 
was 
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 
and the complete FTK Imager report can be 
found in Appendix 1. The image was 
examined with FTK (v1.81.6) and the file 
listing showed the expected MD5 and SHA-1 
hash values for the hash1.bin file (as shown 
in Section 4). 
For Test #2, the thumb drive was 
mounted with WinHex and the contents of 
hash1.bin were copied over the location 
where hash1.bin resided on the thumb drive 
(128 bytes starting at offset 0x6149). The 
purpose of this test was to confirm that 
overwriting data in this way was possible 
and reliable. Note that it was not necessary 
to change anything else on the thumb drive 
since the two files were the same size; no 
changes were necessary to the FAT table 
entries or to the directory name, address, or 
file size. The thumb drive was then re-
imaged. The image verification MD5 hash 
was 
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 -- 
the same as in Test #1. This result confirms 
that overwriting data in this way is an 
adequate process and changes nothing else on 
the drive. A portion of the FTK Imager 
report can be found in Appendix 2. The FTK 
file listing showed the expected MD5 and 
SHA-1 hash values for the hash1.bin file. 
For Test #3, the thumb drive was 
mounted in WinHex and the contents of 
hash2.bin were copied over the location 
where hash1.bin resided on the thumb drive. 
This test was really the crux of the 
hypothesis experiment since hash2.bin is the 
"hash-equivalent, content-different" file to 
hash1.bin. The thumb drive was re-imaged, 
yielding an image verification MD5 hash of 
8045e3c1d5a44eeb5297447b85ecada4 -- 
different than Tests #1 and #2. A portion of 
the FTK Imager report can be found in 
Appendix 3. The FTK file listing showed the 
expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for 
the hash2.bin file. 
For Test #4, the thumb drive was 
mounted with WinHex and the contents of 
hash1.bin were copied back over the location 
where hash2.bin now resided on the thumb 
drive. The purpose of this test was to restore 
the drive to its original state and confirm 
that Test #3 changed nothing more than the 
128 bytes where the test data resided. The 
fourth image verification MD5 hash was 
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 -- 
the same as Tests #1 and #2. This result 
confirms that Test #4 had restored the disk 
to its initial state and that Test #3 changed 
nothing more than the file data. A portion of 
the FTK Imager report can be found in 
Appendix 4. The FTK file listing showed the 
expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for 
the hash1.bin file. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The image verification MD5 hashes in Tests 
#1, #2, and #4 -- images that each held the 
hash1.bin content -- had the same value, 
whereas the image verification MD5 hash 
value in Test #3 -- when the image held the 
hash2.bin content -- was different from the 
other tests. The fact that Tests #1, #2, and 
#4 had the same hash proved that the test 
process worked as desired; the fact that Test 
#3 had a different result shows that the hash 
value of the imaged drive depends upon the 
actual bit content of the entire drive. Since 
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the hash values of the two images are not the 
same, the null hypothesis (H0) is disproven 
and the alternate hypothesis (H1) is proven. 
If the hash value of the disk were a 
function of the hashes of the individual 
components of the disk's contents, then one 
would expect to find the disk image 
unchanged when the files were substituted, 
meaning that the "nightmare scenario" could 
be realized. If the hash of the disk, however, 
were just based upon the bits on the disk, 
the two image hashes would be different 
when the files were exchanged, meaning that 
the scenario could not actually be 
perpetrated in this way. 
Disproving the null hypothesis, then, is 
the expected result because the hash value of 
a disk image is supposed to be based upon 
the bit contents of the disk rather than the 
hashes of the individual files -- including file 
system structures and unallocated space -- 
that compose the disk contents. Thus, even if 
all of the file hashes on two disks are the 
same, the disk image hashes will be different 
if the contents of the files are different. 
Given this result, the scenario described in 
Section 2 cannot be realized. 
It is hoped that this result will lay the 
concern about file hash collisions to rest as 
they apply to digital forensic imaging. As 
long as both individual files and the entire 
image are hashed, the theoretical occurrence 
of individual file collisions is not a factor in 
confirming the evidentiary integrity of a 
forensic copy. 
As noted above, the SHA-1 hash values 
are different for the hash1.bin and hash2.bin 
files, although SHA-1 collisions are also 
theoretically possible (Stevens, Karpman, & 
Peyrin, 2015; Stevens et al., 2017). Since the 
MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms are different, the 
manipulation that can create an MD5 
collision cannot create a SHA-1 collision and, 
to date, no one has yet shown a practical 
method with which to cause both an MD5 
and SHA-1 collision in the same file. The 
results of the experiment reported in this 
paper, however, suggests that it would not 
matter since a file hash collision will still 
result in different image file hashes.
 Table 1.  
Summary of the four tests and the results. 
Description of Test Image MD5 Hash Value 
#1 - Drive with hash1.bin file at bytes 0x6149-0x61C8 d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 
#2 - Overwrite bytes 0x6149-0x61C8 with hash1.bin d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 
#3 - Overwrite bytes 0x6149-0x61C8 with hash2.bin 8045e3c1d5a44eeb5297447b85ecada4 
#4 - Overwrite bytes 0x6149-0x61C8 with hash1.bin d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 
 
NOTE 
All FTK Imager reports, FTK reports, and 
ancillary files are available for examination 
at 
http://www.garykessler.net/gck/hash_test.zi
p. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: FTK Imager report for Test #1 
 
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2  
 
Case Information:  
Acquired using: ADI3.1.3.2 
Case Number: Hash Test 
Evidence Number: 1 
Unique Description:  
Examiner: GCK 
Notes: hash1.bin 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Information for C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test1: 
 
Physical Evidentiary Item (Source) Information: 
[Device Info] 
 Source Type: Physical 
[Drive Geometry] 
 Cylinders: 3 
 Tracks per Cylinder: 255 
 Sectors per Track: 63 
 Bytes per Sector: 512 
 Sector Count: 62,719 
[Physical Drive Information] 
 Drive Model: SanDisk Cruzer Mini USB Device 
 Drive Serial Number:  
 Drive Interface Type: USB 
 Removable drive: True 
 Source data size: 30 MB 
 Sector count:    62719 
[Computed Hashes] 
 MD5 checksum:    d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 
 SHA1 checksum:   169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1 
 
Image Information: 
 Acquisition started:   Mon Jun 20 19:37:47 2016 
 Acquisition finished:  Mon Jun 20 19:37:52 2016 
 Segment list: 
  C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test1.E01 
 
Image Verification Results: 
 Verification started:  Mon Jun 20 19:37:52 2016 
 Verification finished: Mon Jun 20 19:37:52 2016 
 MD5 checksum:    d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 : verified 
 SHA1 checksum:   169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1 : verified 
 
Appendix 2: FTK Imager report (partial) for Test #2 
 
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2  
 
Case Number: Hash Test 2 
Evidence Number: 2 
Examiner: GCK 
Notes: hash1.bin (overwritten) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Information for C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test2: 
 
[Computed Hashes] 
 MD5 checksum:    d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 
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 SHA1 checksum:   169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1 
 
Image Information: 
 Acquisition started:   Mon Jun 20 19:40:24 2016 
 Acquisition finished:  Mon Jun 20 19:40:29 2016 
 Segment list: 
  C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test2.E01 
 
Image Verification Results: 
 Verification started:  Mon Jun 20 19:40:29 2016 
 Verification finished: Mon Jun 20 19:40:29 2016 
 MD5 checksum:    d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 : verified 
 SHA1 checksum:   169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1 : verified 
 
Appendix 3: FTK Imager report (partial) for Test #3 
 
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2  
 
Case Number: Hash Test 
Evidence Number: 3 
Examiner: GCK 
Notes: hash2.bin overwrite 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Information for C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test3: 
 
[Computed Hashes] 
 MD5 checksum:    8045e3c1d5a44eeb5297447b85ecada4 
 SHA1 checksum:   177774eefa63b5e67c04a2e9d2d875e2353400df 
 
Image Information: 
 Acquisition started:   Mon Jun 20 19:43:14 2016 
 Acquisition finished:  Mon Jun 20 19:43:18 2016 
 Segment list: 
  C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test3.E01 
 
Image Verification Results: 
 Verification started:  Mon Jun 20 19:43:18 2016 
 Verification finished: Mon Jun 20 19:43:18 2016 
 MD5 checksum:    8045e3c1d5a44eeb5297447b85ecada4 : verified 
 SHA1 checksum:   177774eefa63b5e67c04a2e9d2d875e2353400df : verified 
 
Appendix 4: FTK Imager report (partial) for Test #4 
 
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2  
 
Case Number: Hash Test 
Evidence Number: 4 
Examiner: GCK 
Notes: hash1.bin re-written 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Information for C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test4: 
 
[Computed Hashes] 
 MD5 checksum:    d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 
 SHA1 checksum:   169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1 
 
Image Information: 
 Acquisition started:   Mon Jun 20 19:45:52 2016 
 Acquisition finished:  Mon Jun 20 19:45:57 2016 
 Segment list: 
  C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test4.E01 
 
Image Verification Results: 
 Verification started:  Mon Jun 20 19:45:57 2016 
 Verification finished: Mon Jun 20 19:45:57 2016 
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 MD5 checksum:    d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 : verified 
 SHA1 checksum:   169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1 : verified 
 
 
